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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the district court of an order
granting summary judgment on the issue of a seller's election of
remedies under a real estate earnest money agreement.

The District

Court's Order was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).

The case was transferred to the Court of

Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4).
ISSUE PRESENTED
Can a seller retain the earnest money paid under an earnest
money

agreement

and

then

afterwards

also

sue

for

damages

in

contravention of the agreement's election of remedies clause?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant/appellant, Mel A. Ball dba The OVNI Trust
(hereafter "Ball"), is appealing from the district court's grant of
partial

summary

judgment

in

favor

of

plaintiff/respondent (hereafter "Jensen").

Richard

A.

Jensen

the

Ball was the seller and

Jensen the purchaser in a real estate transaction which was never
completed.

The parties entered into an Earnest Money Agreement, but

Jensen refused to close the sale of the property because Ball had
misrepresented the size of the building on the property.

After

unsuccessfully demanding return of his earnest money deposit, Jensen
filed a complaint seeking return of the earnest money. Ball retained
the earnest money and also counterclaimed against Jensen, seeking
damages for breach of the agreement.

ber-mOl.bjr
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On December 9, 1987, Jensen filed a motion for partial
summary judgment to dismiss Ball's damage claims on the grounds that
under the terms of the earnest money agreement Ball was required to
make an election between the nonjudicial remedy of retaining Jensen's
earnest money and the judicial remedy of instituting a suit.

The

parties filed memoranda supporting and opposing the motion and the
court heard oral argument on the matter on January 19, 1988.
After oral argument, the court took the matter under
advisement and on March 28, 1988, issued its "Ruling on Motion for
Summary Judgment," (hereafter "District Court's Ruling") [Record on
Appeal (hereafter "Record") at 278-283], granting Jensen's motion.
The court ruled that Ball was on notice that Jensen "did not intend
to abide by the Earnest Money Agreement at the latest when they
accepted service of plaintiff's complaint on May 14, 1986." [District
Court Ruling at 3, Record at 280]. The court ruled that Ball, upon
notice that the deal would not close, was required to elect his remedy
and that he could not both retain the earnest money and institute a
lawsuit.

The court then applied Supreme Court precedent to conclude

that Ball's retention of the earnest money was incontrovertible
evidence that Ball had elected to retain the money as his exclusive
remedy.
Jensen stipulated to a Rule 54(b) motion which the court
granted, thus permitting an immediate appeal of the ruling.

Ball

filed his Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court on October 11, 1988
and the case was later transferred to the Court of Appeals.

ber-mOl. bjr
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 25, 1986, Jensen entered into an Earnest Money
Agreement with Ball for the purchase of warehouse space in North Salt
Lake, Utah.

Under the terms of the agreement, Jensen paid $25,000

earnest money to Ball's real estate agent, John O. Dawson.

Prior to

February 1986, Ball and Dawson had entered into a listing agreement
which provided that Ball would pay a commission to Dawson upon sale
of the property.

[Findings of Fact and Order (hereafter "Order") at

% 6, Record at 211].
A closing was scheduled for May 1986. Following the signing
of the Earnest Money Agreement and prior to closing, a dispute arose
over several important aspects of the agreement and the deal fell
through. Among other things, Ball misrepresented the square footage
available for warehouse space and neglected to make repairs and
improvements which he was obligated to make.
The parties were unable to work out the difficulties. Both
parties maintained and continue to maintain that the other party
breached the contract. Although Jensen demanded return of the earnest
money, Ball did not return or offer to return the earnest money paid
under the agreement.

[Order at % 14, Record at 212].

On May 9, 1986, Jensen brought an action against Ball,
seeking a recision of the agreement and a return of the $25,000
earnest money. On June 12, 1986, Ball counterclaimed, seeking damages
against Jensen for breach of the agreement.
at-211-12].

[Order at f 13, Record

On September 15, 1987, fifteen months after Ball filed

his counterclaim, he testified in his deposition that he had consulted
ber-m01.bjr
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with his attorney and would not return the earnest money. [Deposition
of Mel A. Ball at 47-48, Record at 187-88.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The express language of the earnest money agreement executed
by Ball and Jensen requires that Ball elect either to retain the
earnest money or institute a suit.

This provision allowed Ball to

chose between a judicial and nonjudicial remedy but precluded him from
electing both.

Ball violated the provision by retaining the earnest

money and making a counterclaim against Jensen.

Supreme Court

precedent clearly provides that Ball's failure to return or offer to
return the earnest money prior to bringing a cause of action against
Jensen is incontrovertible evidence that Ball chose to retain the
earnest money as his sole and exclusive remedy.

As a matter of law,

Ball

damages

is

precluded

from

seeking

additional

under

his

counterclaim against Jensen.
Ball's argument that the trial court first must determine
the issue of breach before Ball has to elect his remedy is a
nonsequitur. Such a requirement would render the election of remedies
clause meaningless and would directly contravene the contractual
provision binding the parties as well as settled supreme court
decisions.
The District Court's grant of summary judgment on the issue
of Ball's election of remedies was based upon undisputed material
facts, the express language of the agreement and settled case law.
There is no basis for reversing the decision and it should be
affirmed.
ber-mOl.bjr
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ARGUMENT
I.
BALL IMPROPERLY RAISES CLAIMS OF
DISPUTED FACTS FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
Ball attempts to persuade the Court of Appeals that summary
judgment is improper in this case by raising assertions of disputed
facts for the first time on appeal.

It is improper to make arguments

for the first time on appeal regardless of whether the arguments are
of

fact or

of

law.

See, e.g. , Salt

Lake

City

Corp. v. James

Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Zions
First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654
(Utah 1988)); Western Surety Co. v. Murphy, 754 P.2d 1237, 1240 (Utah
App. 1988).

The court should refuse to consider such arguments.

For

example, Ball asserts that the amount of liquidated damages in this
case is disputed.

[Appellant's Brief at 7 ] . Ball never asserted this

claim before the district court and it should be disregarded

in

reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment.
II.
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT BALL
ELECTED LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AS HIS EXCLUSIVE
REMEDY BY RETAINING JENSEN'S EARNEST MONEY.
This case is not one of first impression and the issue on
appeal is controlled by settled Supreme Court precedent. The District
Court examined the language of the earnest money agreement, reviewed
the Supreme Court cases and correctly ruled that Ball elected to
retain Jensen's earnest money as his exclusive remedy under the

ber-mOl.bjr
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Earnest Money Agreement between Ball and Jensen.1

Having elected to

retain the earnest money, Ball is precluded from seeking additional
damages.
The Earnest Money Agreement [Record at 175-81], expressly
provides:
In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to
either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages
or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller.
Earnest Money Agreement at f N

(emphasis added),

Record at 178.

Ball's rights and obligations under paragraph N were clear:
required

to

"elect"

instituting a suit.

between

retaining

the

He could not choose both.

earnest

he was

money

and

The Supreme Court has

repeatedly held that a seller cannot bring a suit for damages if he
retains the earnest money:
[WJhere there has been a retention of the deposit by
the seller, an action will not lie for recovery of
damages for breach of the contract.
McMullin v. Shimmin. 10 Utah 2d 142, 349 P.2d 720 (1960).

See also

Dowdincr v. Land Funding LTD., 555 P.2d 957, 957 (Utah 1976); Close
v. Blumenthal. 11 Utah 2d 51, 354 P.2d 856, 857 (1960); Andreasen v.
Hansen, 8 Utah P.2d 370, 335 P.2d 404 (1959); Cf. Cadv v. Johnson,
671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983).
The only question remaining in this case is determining
when Ball was required to make his election.

The above-cited cases

make it clear that if the seller does not return the earnest money

The District Court made it clear in its "Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment" entered March 28,
1988, that the only facts upon which it relied were undisputed facts. Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment
at 1, Record at 278.

ber-mOl.bjr
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prior to bringing a suit, he will be barred from seeking additional
damages against the buyer. Dowdinq, 555 P. 2d at 957; Close, 354 P. 2d
at 857; McMullin. 349 P.2d at 721; Andreasen, 335 P.2d at 408.
Consequently, this case does not require precise line drawing as to
when Ball was required to make this election.

It is immaterial

whether he was required to make his election when Jensen first
demanded return of the earnest money, when Jensen filed suit, or
prior to Ball filing his own suit.

The undisputed fact is that

fifteen months after he filed his own suit, Ball continued to assert
his intention to retain the earnest money and has never, throughout
these proceedings, tendered its return to Jensen.
Record at 212].

[Order at f 14,

The cases make it clear that at the latest. Ball had

to make his election before filing his counterclaim.

Having failed

to do so, he is now precluded from seeking additional damages.
Ball fails to cite any cases to support his position.
Further, he does not identify any relevant factual distinctions
between this case and controlling Supreme Court precedent.

In

several instances he either misreads the cases or misrepresents the
facts of this case.2

Ball argues that this case is different from

prior cases because the buyer has contested his liability.

In

effect, Ball is arguing that if a buyer disputes a seller's right to
go after either remedy, the seller gains the right to go after both
remedies. Yet the court in McMullin expressly stated that the buyers

For example, Ball represents that "[t]he amount of liquidated damages was not agreed upon."
Appellant's Brief at 7. There is no basis for this assertion. It is undisputed that both parties executed the
earnest money agreement, [Order at 51 1, Record at 210], and that the agreement provided that Ball could elect
to retain the earnest money as liquidated damages. [Order at % U, Record at 211]. The executed agreement is
a matter of record and Ball cannot disregard its express provisions for the first time on appeal.

ber-mOl.bjr
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in that case also denied liability.

McMullin, 349 P. 2d at 720.

Despite that fact, the court held that the seller had to elect his
remedy prior to bringing suit.3
The fact that Jensen disputed liability or that Ball filed
his action as a counterclaim to Jensen's suit is simply irrelevant.
As the Supreme Court explained in Dowdinq v. Land Funding Ltd., 555
P.2d 957 (1976):
Dowding's brief attempts to point out
factual
distinctions
between
cases
that
heretofore we have processed, such as one being
in equity instead of at law, one suing for less
than all the contract price, etc., which we
consider to be distinctions without pertinence
to the basic problem, that under the terms of the
Earnest Money Agreement if the sale is not
consummated, the damages are as mentioned above,
where the Seller opts to retain the amounts paid
as was the case here, where no offer to return
the sum was made.
Id. at 957 (footnote omitted) .

The basic problem in this case is

exactly the same as the problem posed to the Supreme Court in the
above-cited cases:

the seller is attempting to avoid electing his

remedies by instituting a suit while at the same time retaining the
earnest money.
The election required under the earnest money agreement is
not an election of one among several judicial remedies.

Certainly,

a seller who tenders the earnest money to a buyer and elects to
institute a suit can still elect among judicial remedies such as
damages or specific performance. The election in this case, however,

Further, contrary to Ball's representation in his brief [Appellant's Brief at 7], there is no
indication in Close v. Blumenthal. 11 Utah 2d 51, 354 P.2d 856, 857 (1960), to suggest that in Close the "breach
was undisputed."

ber-mOl.bjr
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requires

that

the

seller

choose

between

a

judicial

remedy

(instituting a suit) and a nonjudicial remedy (retaining the earnest
money).

Having

availed

himself

of the nonjudicial

remedy by

retaining the earnest money, Ball no longer has the option of
pursuing the judicial remedy.
III.
BALL HAD TO ELECT HIS REMEDY BEFORE FILING HIS COUNTERCLAIM
In an attempt to avoid the limitations of the election of
remedies provision, Ball argues that his duty to elect remedies
arises upon a default.

Because Jensen denies that he has any

liability to Ball, Ball reasons, that a "default," and hence Ball's
obligation to elect a remedy, will arise only if and when the court
judicially pronounces that Jensen defaulted.

Additionally, Ball

argues that it is "extremely untenable" to require a seller to elect
his remedy before he "knows" whether or not the buyer breached the
contract.

[Appellant's Brief at 6 (emphasis in original)].

Ball's

tortured interpretation of the election of remedies provision, in
fact, turns that provision on its head.
If Jensen defaulted on his obligations under the earnest
money agreement, which Jensen denies, that default occurred when
Jensen refused to close the sale of the property.

It is entirely

undisputed that Ball was aware, at least by the time Jensen filed the
complaint seeking return of his earnest money deposit, that Jensen
would not close the sale.

At that time, Ball could have been

uncertain about only one thing: Was Jensen correct in claiming that
Jensen was relieved of any obligations under the earnest money
ber-mOl.bjr
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agreement because Ball had breached the agreement, or was Jensen in
default.

If Jensen is correct, Ball has defaulted on the contract,

relieving Jensen of any obligation, and Ball is entitled neither to
retain the earnest money nor to recover damages.
If, on the other hand, Ball

is correct, then Jensen

defaulted three years ago when he refused to close the sale.

The

election of remedies provision is operative upon "default" and the
only possible default by Jensen in this case occurred in 1986.
Although Ball argues that he cannot elect his remedy until the court
determines the issue of breach, Ball has, in fact, already adopted
the position that Jensen defaulted and elected both remedies:
retained

the earnest money without tendering

instituted a cause of action against Jensen.

he

it to Jensen and
Ball is in essence

arguing that the possibility that he is not entitled to either form
of relief entitles him to seek both.
In McMullin v. Shimmin. 10 Utah 2d 142, 720 P.2d 349 (1960) ,
the Utah Supreme Court was faced with deciding the point at which a
seller must elect his remedy under an earnest money agreement.

The

seller in McMullin retained $100 earnest money and brought a suit for
damages against the buyer. As in this case, the buyers "den[ied] any
liability." Id. at 720. The district court dismissed the complaint
at the pre-trial conference "for failure to return or offer to return
the earnest money prior to suit." Id. at 721 (emphasis added).

The

Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint and stated:
The only question as to whether such limit
[to damages] applies is whether or not the option
has been exercised. Such option is exercised by
retention of the down payment. The clause tells
ber-mOl.bjr
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the parties that the seller need only to retain
the sum to exercise his right to keep it. The
seller chooses the language.
His retention
become meaningful when he claims the buyer has
breached the contract and refuses to go through
with it.
Id. (emphasis added).

Ball expressly claimed at the time he filed

his counterclaim that Jensen had breached the agreement.

[See Ball's

Counterclaim at % 7, Record at 41]. The Supreme Court has identified
the seller's claim of breach as the operative event requiring the
seller to elect his remedy.
Ball also argues that it is "extremely untenable" to
require a seller to elect his remedy before he "knows" whether or not
the buyer breached the contract.

In effect, Ball asks this Court to

allow him to pursue his damage claims and to "elect" his remedy only
after a verdict as to the amount of damages, if any, awardable to
Ball has been entered.

At that point, Ball could compare the

liquidated damages and the jury award and select the greater amount.
This interpretation of Ball's obligation to elect his remedy turns
the

contract

language

upside

down

and

results

in

the

truly

"untenable" result.
The seller in Close v. Blumenthal, 11 Utah 2d 51, 354 P.2d
856

(1960),

similarly

wanted

to

simultaneously bring a law suit.

retain the

earnest money and

The Court soundly rejected this

possibility:
It is further to be observed that to permit the
seller to retain the money and also to sue for
specific performance would in effect render the
option clause meaningless by not requiring him to
exercise his option. . . . That he has his
choice is enough without giving him the advantage
ber-mOl.bjr

li

of both alternatives and thus providing two
strings to his bow.
Id, at 857.

Ball seeks the advantage of both alternative remedies,

an option which has been expressly rejected by the Utah Supreme Court
and must be rejected here as well.
IV.
BALL HAD THE LEGAL RIGHT TO DIRECT DfrWSON
TO RETURN THE EARNEST MONEY TO JENSEN.
Ball argues that he cannot return the earnest money to
Jensen since it is in the real estate agent's possession.
undisputed, however, that Dawson acted as Ball's agent.
at f 7, 10, Record at 10.A

It is

See Order

The listing agreement between Ball and

Dawson is part of the record [Record at 174], and Ball admitted that
Dawson was his agent in his deposition.

Ball and Dawson were

represented jointly by the same counsel before the district court and
neither

Ball

nor

Dawson

contested

the

agency

relationship.

Consequently, Ball was in at least constructive possession of the
earnest money and could have tendered it to Jensen.

Addressing a

similar situation, the Supreme Court stated:
The fact is that the defendants' $50 was kept,
and that there was no return nor tender of return
of the money.
We are not unmindful of the
testimony to the effect that the $50 was in the
custody of the Holt Realty Co. But that company
was the appointed agent and acting for the
plaintiffs,
and
the
money
was
thus,
constructively at least, in their possession.

See also Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Statement of
Undisputed Facts INI 1, 5, Record at 162-63; Ball Depo. at 27, Record at 183.

ber-mOl.bjr
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Andreasen v. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P.2d 404, 408 (1959).

Ball

is in constructive possession of the earnest money but never returned
nor tendered return of the money to Jensen.
Ball attempts to excuse his failure to return the money by
asserting that Dawson was also Jensen's agent.

Ball bases this

assertion on the deposition testimony of Brian Call.

A review of

that

any

testimony,

however,

provides

no

evidence

of

agency

relationship between Jensen and Dawson.
Furthermore, an assertion that Dawson had some relationship
with Jensen is irrelevant.

Even presuming the existence of such a

relationship, Ball still could have instructed Dawson to return the
earnest money.

The procedure for disbursing earnest money held in

trust by a broker
relationship.

is not dependant

upon

the broker's

agency

The Administrative Rules of the Division of Real

Estate, Utah Department of Business, Rule 4.2.7.3 provides:
When it becomes apparent to the principal
broker that a transaction has failed, or if a
party to the failed transaction requests
disbursement of the earnest money or other trust
funds, those funds may be disbursed by the
principal broker only if a written release is
obtained from the parties not receiving the
funds.5
Rule 4.2.7.3

(1986) (emphasis added).

Under the terms of Rule

4.2.7.3, Ball could have instructed Dawson to return the earnest
money without any action by Jensen and regardless of any relationship
between Jensen and Dawson.

On the other hand, Jensen could not have

The Rule further provides that the money must be turned over to the court only when the broker is
unable to obtain a signed written release under Rule A.2.7.3.

ber-mOl.bjr
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received the funds from Dawson without Ball's written consent, even
if Dawson had been Jensen's agent.
The critical

and

undisputed

fact

is that Ball never

tendered return of the earnest money and openly asserted, even after
filing his counterclaim, that he intended to retain the earnest
money.

Ball never requested that Dawson disburse the funds to

Jensen. This is merely a further attempt to avoid the effects of the
incontrovertible election which Ball has already made.
CONCLUSION
Ball

and

Jensen

contractually

agreed

that

if Jensen

breached the agreement, Ball could either retain $25,000 earnest
money as liquidated damages or bring a law suit.
provision by doing both.

Ball violated this

The Utah Supreme Court has held that

failure to return the earnest money prior bringing an action for
damages serves as "incontrovertible evidence" that the seller has
elected to retain the earnest money as his "sole and exclusive
remedy."
The fact that Jensen disputes liability and that Ball
brought his action as a counterclaim

to a suit by Jensen is

irrelevant. Further, there is no legal or logical support for Ball's
argument that the court must first determine who was liable for the
breach before Ball has to elect his remedy under paragraph N.

The

possibility that Ball is not entitled to either form of relief does
not entitle him to seek both.
Ball has never made any offer or attempt to return the
earnest money and has testified that he intends to retain the earnest
ber-mOl.bjr
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money.

The Supreme Court has stated that its election of remedies

rule applies even though the earnest money is in the seller's agent's
possession.

Furthermore, the Administrative Rules for the Utah

Division of Real Estate permit Ball to direct that Dawson return the
earnest money to Jensen regardless of Dawson's agency relationship to
Ball or Jensen.

Ball never gave Dawson such an instruction.

The District Court correctly applied controlling Supreme
Court precedent and granted Jensen's motion for partial summary
judgment.

For the above-stated reasons, the Utah Court of Appeals

should AFFIRM the district courtis decision.
Submitted this

C7 *^

day of March, 1989.

KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS
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